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LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Rape Shield Laws and Prior False Accusations of Rape:
The Need for Meaningful Legislative Reform
History, sacred and profane, and the common experience of mankind teach us that
women of the character shown in this case are prone for selfish reasons to make
false accusations both of rape and insult upon the slightest provocation, or even
without provocation for ulterior purposes.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The words of Judge James E. Horton of the Alabama Circuit Court, written in an
opinion that would ultimately curtail his judicial career,2 reflect an age-old fear that
men are often falsely accused of rape. Since Biblical times, society has witnessed the
detrimental effects of false rape accusations and the resulting prejudice directed to-
wards rape complainants. The oft-cited moral teaching of Joseph and Potiphar's wife3
1. Alabama v. Patterson, April 3-9, 1933 (Ala. Cir. Ct. June 22, 1933) (setting aside a death
sentence as against the weight of the evidence and granting a new trial in the Scottsboro case), re-
printed in HAYWOOD PATTERSON & EARL CONRAD, SCOTTSBORO BOY app. at 277 (1950).
The facts of the Scottsboro case, which became a cause celebre concerning the mistreatment of
blacks in the criminal justice system, merit a brief recitation. In 1931 nine black youths, known as the
Scottsboro boys, were accused of raping two white girls while on a Memphis bound freight train. At
the various trials in 1931, the girls testified for the prosecution. Eight of the boys were found guilty
and sentenced to death, while a mistrial was declared for thirteen year-old Roy Wright because the ju-
ry could not decide between a death sentence or life imprisonment. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the convictions and remanded the cases, holding that the boys were not afforded adequate
counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
By this time, the infirmities in the testimony of the girls had become manifest. In January
1932, Ruby Bates, one of the alleged victims, wrote a letter to one of her friends denying that the
black youths had attacked her. At the retrial in 1933 presided over by Judge James E. Horton, Bates
testified for the defense that neither her nor Victoria Price had been raped, and that the story had
been contrived to prevent the girls from being prosecuted for vagrancy. Two days later, however, an
all white jury again convicted the defendants. Judge Horton, citing the inconsistencies and contradic-
tions in the testimony, granted a motion for a new trial on the ground that the conviction was against
the weight of the evidence.
For a complete account of the Scottsboro case, see generally, PATTERSON & CONRAD, supra;
JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTITSBORO (1994); DAN CARTER, SCOTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE
AMERICAN SoUTH (rev. ed. 1979).
2. Judge Horton's reversal of the jury verdict met with harsh criticism, and he reluctantly with-
drew from the case under pressure from Alabama Chief Justice John Anderson. CARTER, supra note 1,
at 272-73. Judge Horton was defeated in the 1934 election for circuit court judge, although his beliefs
concerning false rape allegations played little role in bringing about his defeat. As a final show of
contumaciousness, the voters rewarded Thomas G. Knight, the Attorney General who prosecuted the
case, by electing him Lieutenant Governor. Id.
3. Joseph the Israelite was a slave in the house of Potiphar the Egyptian. After a time,
Potiphar's wife began to look fondly at Joseph. When Joseph refused to lie with Potiphar's wife, she
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demonstrates that "a woman scorned-especially if she is gentile-can get a good man
into a hell of a lot of trouble by crying rape."4 In the face of stories like these, it is
not surprising that many people still agree with the proposition that men are often
falsely accused of rape,5 despite studies that have shown that the frequency of rape
reports proven false, approximately two percent, mirrors the false reporting rates for
other crimes.6 Nonetheless, the fear of false rape accusations and the popular miscon-
ceptions about the tendency of women to lie about being raped, have suffused Ameri-
can law since the colonial period.7 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, scholars exagger-
ated the problem of false rape accusations by providing theories, supported largely by
anecdotal evidence, explaining why a woman would falsely accuse a man of rape.'
Consequently, many rape complainants suffered unjustly as a result of these specious
arguments grounded in amateur psychology.9
the last quarter century has witnessed a substantial lessening of the general
distrust of rape complainants that punctuated earlier jurisprudence. Sadly, however,
some women do lie about being raped.' And the lives of some men are ruined by
seized his cloak and accused him of coming to her with the intent to seduce her. Joseph was impris-
oned, but later obtained a full pardon. Genesis 39:7-20; see SUSAN BROWNMILER, AGAINST OUR
WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 21-22 (1975) for a modem feminist interpretation of this story.
4. BROWNMILLER, supra note 3, at 22.
5. JOYCE E. WILLIAMS & KAREN A. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT: RAPE AND PUBLIC ATT-
TUDES 136 tbl.18 (1981). Williams and Holmes conducted a study from a random sample of the San
Antonio, Texas population. When presented with the proposition that men are often falsely accused of
rape, the following rates of agreement were noted: Anglo-American men, 40%, Anglo-American wom-
en, 63%; African-American men, 92%, African-American women, 41%; Mexican-American men, 73%,
and Mexican-American women, 57%. Id.
6. See Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial
in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1028 (1991) (citing Patricia A. Harwig &
Georgette Bennett Sandier, Rape Victims: Reasons, Responses, and Reforms, in THE RAPE VICTIM 13
(Deanna R. Nass ed. 1977)).
7. During his career as a lawyer in colonial Virginia, Thomas Jefferson advocated eliminating the
state's castration punishment for rape. Defending his position, Jefferson protested of "the temptation
women would be under to make it an instrument of vengeance against an inconstant lover, and of dis-
appointment to a rival." WNTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OvER BLACK: AMERICAN ATITUDES TOWARD
THE NEGRO 1550-1812 463-64 (1968) (quoting 9 THOMAS JEFFERSON, PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
(Julian P. Boyd ed. 1950) (letter to James Madison)).
8. The 1970 Wigmore treatise on evidence stated:
Modem psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young girls and women
coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes are multifarious,
distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements or abnormal in-
stincts, partly by bad social environment, partly by temporary physiological or emotional
conditions. One form taken by these complexes is that of contriving false charges of
sexual offenses by men.
3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 924a, at 736 (Chadboum rev.
1970).
Similarly, an unsigned comment in the 1970 University of Pennsylvania Law Review opined:
Women often falsely accuse men of sexual attacks to extort money, to force marriage, to
satisfy a childish desire for notoriety, or to attain personal revenge. Their motives in-
clude hatred, a sense of shame after consenting to illicit intercourse, especially when
pregnancy results.
Comment, The Corroboration Rule and Crimes Accompanying a Rape, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 458, 460
(1970).
9. For an article discussing the flaws in the logic of these sources, see Julie Taylor, Rape and
Women's Credibility: Problems of Recantations and False Accusations Echoed in the Case of Cathleen
Crowell Webb and Gary Dotson, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 78-79 (1987).
10. Newspapers abound with stories of rape recantations. See Bill Rams, Woman Fabricated Mall
Rape Story to Hide Affair, Police Say, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 12, 1997, at B4, available in
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false rape charges." How should prior false accusations be handled in subsequent liti-
gation involving the same complainant? The Federal Rules of Evidence and compara-
ble state evidence codes must fairly handle the false accusations without subjecting all
rape complainants to unjust scrutiny. This Note proposes the enactment of a new Rule
of Evidence designed to handle specifically a complainant's prior false sexual assault
allegations. Such an enactment, allowing the introduction of false rape allegations
through both cross-examination and extrinsic evidence 2 after a requisite showing of
falsity is established, would provide necessary stability and guidance in this controver-
sial area of the law. This rule would afford a criminal defendant the opportunity to
benefit from this highly probative evidence of credibility, without subjecting all rape
complainants to a rigorous and demeaning examination of their sexual history. The
exclusive purpose of this rule would be to examine lies, not sexual behavior.
The next section of this Note describes the institutionalized prejudices faced by
rape complainants at common law, and details the corresponding transitions that rape
law has undergone to mitigate, if not remove, these prejudices. Part III reconciles the
judicial treatment given to false rape accusations with the existing character and credi-
1997 WL 7415609; Gina Sitaramiah, When a Woman Says 'I Take It Back': False Rape Allegations
Can Only Hurt Real Victims, But Recent High-Profile Cases Don't Seem to Be Damaging, KAN. CITY
STAR, Mar. 17, 1997, at DI, available in 1997 WL 3007816; Jason Sickes & Robert Ingrassia, Cow-
boy Allegations Discredited: Woman May Face Charge After Rape Inquiry Dropped, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 12, 1997, at IA, available in 1997 WL 2638658; Maryann Spoto, Woman Who Cried
Rape in Union Jail Is Now Being Sought as a Fugitive: Prosecutor Charges Her with Filing False
Report and Recanting Story, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ.), Apr. 30, 1996, at 37, available in 1996
WL 7930624; Dan Kelly, Rape Charges Dismissed as Lies, READING EAGLE (Reading, Pa.), Feb. 2,
1996, at BI, available in 1996 WL 2196738; Tony Perry, DNA Test Frees Inmate After 10 Years Jus-
tice: Frederick Daye Spent a Decade in Vacaville on Kidnaping and Rape Charges. A Lawyer and a
TV Reporter Fought to Win His Release, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1994, at 3, available in 1994 WL
2349767; Jennifer Warren, Dad Challenges Memory Therapyl Daughter's Accusations of Rape as a
Young Girl Ruined His Life, MORNING NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), April 7, 1994, at Al, available
in 1994 WL 4629530; Rape Charges Dropped Against Rapper 'Run,' Cmt. TRIB., Feb. 21, 1992, at 2,
available in 1992 WL 4455497; Jolayne Houtz, Rape Puzzle Broke Apart With Last Piece-Charges
Dropped Against Man, SEATrLE TIMES, Jan. 14, 1992, at B1, available in 1992 WL 5007683; Tom
Coakley, Man Seeks Charges in Rape Accusation, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 1988, at 70, available in
1988 WL 4631242.
11. The most publicized false rape allegation case in the last half of the century involved
Cathleen Crowell Webb and Gary Dotson. In 1976 the sixteen year-old Cathleen Crowell Webb
claimed she had been raped, and identified Gary Dotson as her assailant. Dotson was convicted and
sentenced to an incarceration term of twenty-five to fifty years. Six years after the trial, Webb, citing
her beliefs as a born-again Christian, recanted her story. She had contrived the story because she was
concerned about the consequences of her promiscuity. In 1985, after serving nearly six years of his
sentence, Dotson received clemency trom Illinois Governor James Thompson. For a more thorough
explication of the case, see Taylor, supra note 9, at 61-74. This author is troubled by the use of high
rates of non-reported rapes to contrast the belief that many women falsely accuse men of rape. Morri-
son Torrey concludes that "The myth is false claims of rape; the reality is severe underreporting of
rape." Torrey, supra note 6, at 1030-31. While this author acknowledges that underreporting of rape is
a common and troubling phenomenon, the use of reporting statistics to refute concerns about false rape
allegations is inappropriate. Torrey seems to be arguing that the problem of underreporting obviates the
need to worry about false rape accusations. On the contrary, these are different problems and must be
considered separately. False rape accusations do occur, ruining the lives and reputations of those ac-
cused. Consequently, the reality of underreporting is a separate problem and is of no consolation to
those falsely accused of rape.
12. Although not explicitly defined in the Federal Rules, extrinsic evidence in the context of im-
peachment refers to "evidence other than that which is spoken from the witnesses [sic] mouth while
he or she is on the stand. The evidence may be anther's [sic] testimony, a written document, physical
object, or documentation of previous testimony." Janeen Kerper & Bruce E. MacDonald, Federal Rule
of Evidence 608(b): A Proposed Revision, 22 AKRON L. REv. 283 (1989).
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bility rules, including the various justifications provided by appellate courts for circum-
venting these rules. Part IV argues that the flexible, case specific application of the
character and credibility rules should be replaced by a single rule to treat new prior
false accusations of rape. Finally, Part V contains and explains the author's proposed
model rule for dealing with prior false allegations of rape. 3
II. MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS IN RAPE LAW
During the 1970s and 1980s, the criminal justice system, in an attempt to lessen
the prejudices faced by rape complainants, radically altered the way it handled rape
cases. Prior to that time, the common law treatment of rape cases, shaped by English
common law and subsequently adopted by most American jurisdictions, discouraged
rape prosecutions and frustrated rape victims. At common law, a woman who con-
cealed her injury for a considerable period of time was presumed to have feigned her
story.'4 Consonant with the treatment of women as chattel property, common law pro-
vided a spousal exemption for rape. 5 As part of the "forcible compulsion" require-
ment, a woman was required to resist to the utmost, except where precluded by fear of
grave harm. 6 If a woman failed to provide such resistance, it was presumed that she
must have either consented or encouraged the rapist. As the common law abolished the
corroboration requirement for all crimes except perjury, corroboration for sex offenses
was not required. 7 Concerned about unfounded accusations of rape, however, several
states, through statute or judicial decision, installed a specific corroboration require-
ment for rape prosecutions. 8 Juries received cautionary instructions about the ease
13. Since most sex crimes are prosecuted in state courts, there is a paucity of federal cases in-
volving prior false accusations by a complaining witness. Moreover, many of these cases are
uninstructive. Consequently, most of the cases referred to in this Note will be state cases. As most
states, however, have adopted rules of character and credibility evidence resembling the Federal Rules
of Evidence, this paper will use the federal rules as a model.
14. During the reign of Henry III, a woman was required to report her injury immediately follow-
ing the attack. The statute Westm. I. cap. 13 lengthened the reporting period to forty days from the
attack, providing that the failure of a woman to prosecute within that time reduced the offense to a
trespass. Additionally, the statute lessened to two years imprisonment the punishment for rape. Al-
though the prompt complaint requirement was abolished by the time of Blackstone's writing, he noted
that "the jury will rarely give credit to a stale complaint." 4 W.LLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *211-12.
15. "But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for
by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her
husband, which she cannot retract." I MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
629 (Philadelphia, 1st American ed., 1847) (1736).
16. Although rape was committed if a woman ceased resistance under fear of death of duress, the
prosecution had to prove that the defendant intended to complete his purpose in defiance of all resis-
tance. 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1143 (7th
ed. 1874).
17. Although not required, corroboration increased significantly the likelihood that a conviction
would result from a prosecution. Blackstone stated that "if [the prosecuting witness] be of evil fame,
and stands unsupported by others . . . these and the like circumstances carry a strong, but not conclu-
sive, presumption that her testimony is false or feigned." 4 BLAcKsToNE, supra note 14, at *213-14.
Additionally, the failure to produce corroborative evidence when such evidence was available weighed
against the prosecution. 2 WHARTON, supra note 16, § 1149 (7th ed. 1874).
18. Supporters of corroboration requirements offered three justifications for corroboration re-
quirements, all motivated by the nature of the offense. Corroboration requirements: (1) minimized the
risk that false charges would be brought; (2) balanced the sympathy given the victim by the jury; and
(3) served as an appropriate evidentiary requirement, given the difficulty of defending against a rape
charge. See generally Comment, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE
L.J. 1365 (1972).
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with which rape charges could be brought, and the difficulty of defending against such
charges. 9 Finally, the chastity of the rape victim could be examined, in an attempt to
show that her willingness to consent to previous sexual encounters increased the possi-
bility that she consented in this situation.' John Henry Wigmore, the leading evi-
dence scholar of the 1900s and no friend to rape victims, suggested that "[n]o judge
should let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social
history and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physi-
cian."' Unsympathetic treatment received from the state, coupled with personal pri-
vacy concerns and a desire to put the matter behind them, caused many victims not to
report their attacks,' especially in cases of non-stranger or acquaintance rape.23 Until
19. The difficulty of defending against rape charges was described in the oft-quoted passage by
Matthew Hale:
It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially to
be punished with death; but it must be remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be
made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never
so innocent.
1 HALE, supra note 15, at 635. Consequently, many states followed the advice of Hale and established
standard jury instructions resembling the following California instruction:
A charge such as that made against the defendant in this case is one which is easily
made and, once made, difficult to defend against, even if the person accused is innocent.
Therefore, the law requires that you examine the testimony of the female person named
in the information with caution.
Cal. Jury Instructions-Criminal No. 10.22 (3d ed. 1970).
Prior to 1975, the following cases held that a similar cautionary instruction should be given
under particular circumstances: People v. Lucas, 105 P.2d 102 (Cal. 1940) (charge of contributing to
the delinquency of a minor through sexual acts); People v. Putnam, 129 P.2d 367 (Cal. 1942) (charge
of committing lewd and lascivious acts upon a child); People v. Nye, 237 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1951) (any
sexual offense not involving children); People v. Merriam, 426 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1967) (virtually any
sexual case, regardless of whether it is requested by the defendant); Howell v. State, 136 So. 456 (Fla.
1931) (charge of incest); Territory v. Bodine, 32 Haw. 528 (1932) (charge of rape); Reynolds v. State,
42 N.W. 903 (Neb. 1889) (charge of rape); State v. Clevenger, 202 P. 687 (N.M. 1921) (charge of
rape where the evidence is conflicting); State v. Fulks, 160 N.W.2d 418 (S.D. 1968) (any charge
where a conviction could be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness);
Connors v. State, 2 N.W. 1143 (Wis. 1879) (charge of rape). As this list only includes cases requiring
such an instruction, it is necessarily under-inclusive. Many states made discretionary the giving of the
instruction. Since an acquittal cannot be appealed by the prosecution, this list omits the vast number of
cases in which a cautionary instruction was given and an acquittal resulted.
20. As Blackstone wrote, "Mhe law of England does not judge so hardly of offenders, as to cut
off all opportunity of retreat even from common strumpets ... It therefore holds it to be felony to
force even a concubine or harlot; because the woman may have forsaken that unlawful course of life."
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *213. Since the defendant could impeach the character of the victim
for chastity, the fact that the complaining witness was of evil fame was certainly considered by the
jury.
21. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 924a, at 737.
22. The two most common measures of criminal activity are the Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs),
collected from data submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by law enforcement agencies, and
the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), a yearly household survey designed to provide a
measurement of both reported and unreported victimizations. Notwithstanding minor differences between
the two surveys in the definition of rape, comparisons between these surveys are used to show the un-
reported nature of rape. In 1988, for example, the UCRs showed 92,486 rapes being committed, while
the NCVS figure was 127,370. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1988 27 (1989); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1988 14 (1989). In 1991, the UCR reported 106,593 offenses,
while the NCVS reported 173,310 offenses. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1991 23 (1992); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1991 [hereinafter CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1991] 16
(1992).
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rape reforms originated in the mid 1970s, the meager number of rape convictions
produced under these restrictions evidenced the futility of the rigorous and demeaning
processes that rape complainants were forced to undergo.24
Widespread and justified criticism that rape law was unfair to women precipitat-
ed enormous changes in the legislative and judicial treatment of rape cases." No state
preserves the spousal exemption in its unqualified form, and fifteen states have com-
pletely eliminated the distinction between marital and non-marital rape. 6 In a
movement that some feminists think may ultimately damage the cause of women in
general, 7 new statutes and case law have recognized as forcible compulsion threats
other than the use of overt physical force. 8 Addressing the issue of victim consent,
Other attempts have been made to estimate the prevalence of rape in society. See Mary Koss et
al., The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a Na-
tional Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 162, 168 (1987)
(concluding that, since the age of 14, 27.5 percent of female college students had experienced an act
that met legal definitions of rape, including attempts); but cf. Neil Gilbert, The Phantom Epidemic of
Sexual Assault, PUB. INT. at 54 (Spring 1991) (discussing possible flaws in Koss's "advocacy num-
bers").
23. Between 1973 and 1991, the reporting rate for sexual offenses, without regard to victim-at-
tacker relationship, varied from 45 to 61 percent, consistently making it one the most frequently re-
ported crimes. See CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, supra note 22, at 8. When a relationship exists between
the victim and the attacker, the reporting rate is significantly lower. Of the approximately 173,300
rapes reported in the NCVS, 83,000, or approximately 47.8 percent involved non-strangers. However,
61.9 percent of all victimizations involving strangers were reported to the police, whereas 55.4 percent
of all victimizations involving non-strangers were reported. CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, supra note 22, at
102-03.
24. See Harry Kalven, Jr., & Hans Zeisel, THE AMERICAN JURY 352-54 (1966) (discussing the
willingness of jurors to acquit in rape cases where judges would have convicted). During the early
1970s, the entire state of New York only averaged 18 rape convictions per year. Justice System is Ex-
panding Rape Prosecutions, Study Finds, 25 CRiM. JUST. NEWSL., May 16, 1994, at 3.
25. JOEL EPSTEIN & STACIA LANGENBAHN, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY RESPONSE
TO RAPE passim (1994).
26. Only one state, Oklahoma, still defines rape as "intercourse involving vaginal or anal
penetration accomplished with a male or female who is not the spouse of the perpetrator . . . " OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21. § 1111 (West 1983 & Supp. 1996). By 1994, twenty four states had removed any
type of marital rape exemption. Some states abolished the exemption through statute, while other state
courts struck down the exemption as a violation of equal protection. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 474
N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985); Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1986); Williams v. State, 494 So. 2d 819 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); People v. M.D., 595
N.E.2d 702 (IIl. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 467 (Ill. 1992); Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775
(Wyo. 1987).
See also ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 45-72 (1994); DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 375-82 (2d ed. 1990); Lisa R.
Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and Reconceptualizing Its Prose-
cution, 48 STAN. L. REv. 677, 681-82 (1996); Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1498, 1533-34 (1993); Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape
Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1255 (1986).
27. As one feminist has written: "[We don't want the law to patronize women; when it did, in a
vast number of areas, we fought it and won significant victories. To treat as victims in a legal sense
all of the female victims of life is at some point to cheapen, not celebrate, the rights to self-determi-
nation, sexual autonomy, and self- and societal respect of women." Vivian Berger, Not So Simple
Rape, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICs 69, 75 (1988).
28. Wisconsin, Utah and Washington have criminalized nonconsensual intercourse without force or
threat. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (1995); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West 1988); see also State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (NJ.
1992) (statutory crime of sexual assault did not require physical force in addition to involuntary or un-
wanted sexual penetration); Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994) (although convic-
tion for rape required forcible compulsion, no such requirement existed for indecent assault).
1998] Rape Shield Laws
some courts have reduced or eliminated the "reasonable mistake" defense, a result
unique to rape cases.'
Aside from the definition and state of mind requirements stated above, the law of
evidence as applied to rape cases underwent a similar transformation. The
corroboration requirement once so prevalent in American rape law was abandoned by
most of the states.3° Through statute or judicial decision, many jurisdictions aban-
doned the jury instruction concerning the ease of making or the difficulty of defending
against a rape charge." Additionally, the Congress and forty-nine states have passed
"rape-shield" laws to exclude evidence of a rape complainant's past sexual history to
establish consent." Of the modem developments in rape law, the emergence of rape
For a more thorough explication on the force element in modem rape cases, see Daphne Ed-
wards, Comment, Acquaintance Rape & The "Force" Element: When "No" is Not Enough, 26 GOLD-
EN GATE U. L. REV. 241 (1996); Joshua Mark Fried, Forcing the Issue: An Analysis of the Various
Standards of Forcible Compulsion in Rape, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1277 (1996); Major Timothy Murphy, A
Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 A.F. L. REV. 19 (1996).
29. See Commonwealth v. Ascolillo, 541 N.E.2d 570 (Mass. 1989) (reasonable mistake as to con-
sent was not a valid defense to rape); State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291 (Me. 1984) (same). Rather than
follow the strict liability theory imposed by these courts, Indiana took a different approach to the rea-
sonable mistake defense. In Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), the Indiana Court of
Appeal held that Tyson was not entitled to a jury instruction stating that a reasonable mistake as to
consent would be a defense. The justification for refusing to give the instruction lay in the fact that
there was no equivocal conduct from which Tyson could have believed that the complainant was con-
senting. According to the court, "There is no recitation of equivocal conduct by D.W. which reason-
ably could have led Tyson to believe that D.W. only appeared to consent to the charged sexual con-
duct; no gray area exists from which Tyson can logically argue that he misunderstood D.W.'s ac-
tions . . . [I]t does not support the giving of a mistake of fact instruction." Id. at 295. For a stinging
criticism of this equivocal conduct requirement, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME
129-31 (1995).
30. For a discussion of the states that have abandoned their corroboration requirements, see
Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Regarding Necessity for Corroboration of
Victim's Testimony in Prosecution for Sexual Offense, 31 A.L.R.4th 120 (1984). Despite the modem
trend to remove the corroboration requirement, Mississippi still provides: "no person shall be convicted
[of rape] upon the uncorroborated testimony of the injured female." MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-69
(1994).
31. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-408 (West. Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.6 (West
1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461B (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.186 (1997); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3106 (West Supp. 1997); United States v. Vik, 655 F.2d 878 (8th Cir. 1981); Burke v.
State, 624 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1980); State v. Settle, 531 P.2d 151 (Ariz. 1975); People v. Rincon-
Pineda, 538 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1975); Mart v. State, 470 So.2d 703 (Fla. App.); Overton v. State, 199
S.E.2d 205 (Ga. 1973); State v. Gong, 764 P.2d 453 (Idaho App. 1988); Taylor v. State, 278 N.E.2d
273 (Ind. 1972); State v. Feddersen, 230 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1975); State v. Selman, 300 So.2d 467
(La. 1974); State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918 (Mont. 1984); State v. Bashaw, 672 P.2d 48 (Or. 1983);
State v. Jette, 569 A.2d 438 (R.I. 1990); State v. Holcomb, 643 S.W.2d 336 (Tenn. Crim. 1982); State
v. Reddish, 550 P.2d 728 (Utah 1976); State v. Wilder, 486 P.2d 319 (Wash. 1971).
32. FED. R. EVID. 412; ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Michie &
Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-42-101 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1995); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782,
1103 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3508-3509
(1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 794.022 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (1995 & Supp.
1996); HAW. R. EVID. 412; IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1987); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-7
(West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Michie 1994); IOWA R. EVID. 412; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3525 (1995); KY. R. EVID. 412; LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art. 412 (West 1995); ME. R.
EVID. 412; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B (Law. Co-op.
1986); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1991); MNN. R. EVID. 412; MISS. R. EID. 412;
MO. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-321 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 632-A:6 (1996 & Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7 (West Supp. 1996); N.M. R. ANN. § 11-
413 (Michie 1997); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1992); N.C. R. EVID. 412; N.D. CENT.
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shield statutes has caused the most controversy and has generated voluminous amounts
of literature.33
The criminal justice system's long-awaited efforts to make the disposition of rape
charges and convictions more efficient and fairer to complainants has increased the
importance of the credibility of the complainant. Since defendants are no longer al-
lowed to examine the prior sexual history of the complainant, they must focus their
attention primarily on the complainant's character for truthfulness.3 4 Instead of show-
ing promiscuity, the defense attorney must show mendacity. Such mendacity may be
established for the fact-finder through the introduction of prior false rape accusations
by the complainant. The American evidentiary system, largely through judicial treat-
ment, has looked with great skepticism upon complaining witnesses who have made
prior false allegations of rape against other men.35 This skepticism has resulted in the
admission into evidence of a complaining witnesses' prior false rape charges.
CODE §§ 12.1-20-14 to -15 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Anderson 1996); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2412 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.210 (1988 & Supp.
1996); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (West 1983); R.I. R. EVID. 412; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
659.1 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIrED LAws § 23A-22-15 (Michie Supp. 1996);
TENN. R. EviD. 412; TEx. R. CRIM. EviD. 412; UTAH R. EVID. 412; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255
(Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Michie 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020
(West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-11 (1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2)(b) (West 1995 & Supp.
1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-312 (Michie 1988). The lone state that does not have a rape shield
statute, Arizona, has prohibited through judicial decision character evidence concerning unchastity for
substantive purposes on the issue of consent. State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 545 P.2d 946 (Ariz.
1976).
33. Some of the more valuable commentaries on the subject can be found in: Ann Althouse,
Thelma and Louise and the Law: Do Rape Shield Rules Matter?, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 757 (1992);
Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second
Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763 (1986); David Haxton, Comment, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional
Despite Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1219; J. Alexander Tanford &
Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544
(1980); Leon Letwin, "Unchaste Character," Ideology, and the California Rape Laws, 54 S. CAL. L.
REv. 35 (1980); Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977); Abraham P. Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct:
The Unlamented Death of Character for Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 90 (1977).
34. In the 1991 rape trial of William Kennedy Smith, the defense strategy was to develop the
motives of the complainant, Patricia Bowman, to lie about the accusations. Consequently, the defense
attempted to introduce evidence of a history of abuse and resentment towards men. Although Judge
Mary Lupo rejected the defense efforts to probe the background of Ms. Bowman, future counsel can
be expected to construct similar defenses. See Susan Estrich, PaLm Beach Stories, 11 LAW & PHIL. 5,
14-16 (1992).
35. Torrey, supra note 6, at 1039; see also Denise R. Johnson, Prior False Allegations of Rape:
Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINsM 243 (1995); James A. Vaught & Marga-
ret Henning, Admissibility of a Rape Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct in Texas: A Contemporary Review
and Analysis, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 893, 901 (1992).
36. Four states provide specific exceptions in their rape shield statutes to admit prior false accusa-
tions of rape. Miss R. EVID. 412, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2412(B)(2) (West 1993 & 1997
Supp.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255(a)(3)(C) (Supp. 1996); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2)(b) (West
1995 & Supp. 1996). Other states have reached the same result through judicial decision. Phillips v.
State, 545 So.2d 221, 223 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); West v. State, 719 S.W.2d 684, 686-87 (Ark.
1986); People v. Burrell-Hart, 237 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Smith v. State, 377
S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ga. 1989); Little v. State, 413 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Cox v. State,
443 A.2d 607, 613 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991
(Mass. 1978); Miller v. State, 779 P.2d 87, 89 (Nev. 1989); State v. Durham, 327 S.E.2d 920, 926
(N.C. CL App. 1985); State v. Baron, 292 S.E.2d 741, 743 (N.C. CL App. 1982); State v. Boggs, 588
N.E.2d 813, 816 (Ohio 1992); State v. LeClair, 730 P.2d 609, 613 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); Clinebell v.
Virginia, 368 S.E.2d 263, 264-65 (Va. 1988).
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I. ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR FALSE RAPE ACCUSATIONS
The Federal Rules treat differently the character of a victim or the accused in a
criminal case from the character of a witness." Under the Federal Rules, the alleged
victim of a sexual assault assumes the dual role of victim and witness. Consequently,
relevant evidence" about the alleged victim may be introduced through either the 400
rules governing character or the 600 rules governing the credibility of a witness.
Through these rules, evidence about the prior false allegations of rape may be admit-
ted. Additionally, some courts have held that the admission of prior false accusations
of rape by a complaining witness are constitutionally required to be admitted. This
section examines the interesting and novel theories by which evidence of specific false
rape accusations has been admitted.
A. Admissible as Evidence of Character
Since character evidence often possesses low probative value and high potential
for prejudice,39 this type of evidence is viewed with a skeptical eye. Federal Rule of
Evidence 404 provides that evidence of a person's character may not be admitted to
prove that the person acted in conformity with that character on a particular occa-
sion.' The rule, however, provides an exception for the admission of testimony re-
garding a pertinent trait of character by the victim. 4' For example, the defendant in a
homicide case may introduce evidence that the victim was a violent person. Evidence
allowed under this exception to Rule 404 may be proved by reputation or opinion
37. Although the Federal Rules include credibility rules under the broad umbrella of character
rules, this paper will use the term "character rules" to refer to Rules 404 and 405, governing the char-
acter of an accused or victim. The term "credibility rules" will refer to Rules 607, 608 and 609, gov-
erning the credibility of a witness.
38. Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. FED. R. EVID. 401.
39. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EviDENcE § 186, at 342 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992).
40. Rule 404 provides:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his char-
acter is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of
a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homi-
cide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor,
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in rules
607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not ad-
missible to prove the character of a person in order to show conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided
that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide rea-
sonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on
good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404.
41. FED R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
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testimony.' Similarly, if the character of a person is an essential element of a charge
or defense, such as in a defamation case, proof may be made of specific instances of
that person's conduct.43 As with all relevant evidence, evidence about a person's char-
acter may be excluded under Rule 403 if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion or waste of time."
Under Rule 404, a defendant in a sexual assault case can argue that sexual inter-
course had occurred, but that it was consensual. Until 1978, the defendant could intro-
duce evidence about the victim's prior sexual behavior, implying that since the alleged
victim had consented to sexual activity before, it was more likely that she had consent-
ed on this occasion. Although evidence about the alleged victim's character for promis-
cuity was shown most frequently through reputation and opinion testimony, some
courts allowed defendants to introduce specific instances of sexual conduct concerning
the alleged viL..
Following the example of many states, in 1978 Congress added Federal Rule of
Evidence 412.' Rule 412, enacted "to protect rape victims from the degrading and
embarrassing disclosure of intimate details about their private lives,"'47 governs the
admissibility of character evidence tending to prove the unchaste character of the vic-
tim. Although the original Rule 412 applied only to criminal proceedings, in 1994
Congress extended the coverage of the rule to any civil or criminal proceedings involv-
ing sexual misconduct.' The current rule49 prohibits the introduction of any evidence
42. F D. R. EVID. 405(a).
43. Federal Rule of Evidence 405(b) provides:
Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a
person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made
of specific instances of that person's conduct.
FED. R. EvID. 405(b).
44. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 403.
45. At English common law, the defendant could impeach the character of the alleged victim
through "general evidence, but not by particular acts." 2 WHARTON, supra note 16, § 1151. Wharton
noted that this view was pushed so far that "the witness was not bound to say whether she had had
connection with other men, or with a particular person named; and that evidence of her having had
such connection was inadmissible." 2 id.
The American courts split over whether to follow their English counterparts. By the beginning
of the twentieth century, New York, Vermont, Michigan, California and North Carolina had abandoned
the English rule and had allowed the introduction of evidence concerning specific acts of unchastity by
the alleged victim. 2 id. § 1152.
Wigmore's treatise noted an increase during the 1940s and 1950s in decisions allowing the
admission of evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim's unchastity. IA WIGMORE, supra
note 8, § 62.1, at 1318.
46. Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1976, Pub. L. 95-540 § 2(a), 92 Stat. 2046
(1978). The process used to enact Rule 412 deviated from the usual rule-making process. Under the
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994), Congress has vested the federal judiciary with
the power to prescribe the rules of evidence for federal courts. Once a rule is prescribed for approval
by the judiciary, which includes, among other procedures, approval by the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States, the rule is forwarded to Congress for consideration. Congress may either amend, reject, or
approve any of the rules. In rare situations, Congress will enact a rule without paying deference to the
judicial consideration. Rule 412, a political "hot potato," represents a situation where Congress acted
unilaterally.
47. 124 CONG. REC. Hi1944 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Mann).
48. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40141,
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offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior or to prove
any alleged victim's sexual predisposition. In a criminal proceeding, specific in-
stances of an alleged victim's sexual predisposition are admissible only in three cir-
cumstances: (1) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused when offered
to show that the accused was not the source of semen, injury, or other physical evi-
dence;5 (2) past sexual behavior with the accused to prove that the alleged victim
consented to the alleged offense;52 (3) when constitutionally required to be
admitted. In order for evidence of sexual behavior to be admitted in a civil case, the
probative value of the evidence must substantially outweigh the danger of harm to any
victim and unfair prejudice to any party.54 Before evidence can be admitted under any
108 Stat. 1919 (1994).
49. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 provides:
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in any
civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in
subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behav-
ior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise admissible
under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim of-
fered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen,
injury or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with
respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the accused to
prove consent or by the prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the
defendant.
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual predispo-
sition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these
rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any vic-
tim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's reputation
is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim.
(c) Procedure to determine admissibility.
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b) must:
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically describing the
evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered unless the court, for good
cause requires a different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim or, when appro-
priate, the alleged victim's guardian or representative.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must conduct a hearing in
camera and afford the victim and parties a right to attend and be heard. The motion,
related papers, and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal
unless the court orders otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. 412.
50. The use of the words "any victim" in Rule 412 extends the rule to "pattern' witnesses in
both criminal and civil cases whose testimony about other instances of sexual misconduct by the per-
son accused is otherwise admissible." FED. R. EviD. 412 advisory committee's note.
51. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A).
52. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B).
53. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C). This provision serves no practical purpose. Evidence constitution-
ally required to be admitted must be admitted, regardless of whether a specific provision in the rules
allows for its admission.
54. FED. R. EVD. 412(b)(2). This balancing test is an inverse of the usual Rule 403 test for un-
fair prejudice, which allows relevant evidence to be admitted unless the probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
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of the exceptions to Rule 412, the party seeking to introduce the evidence must file a
written motion at least 14 days before trial," serve the motion on all parties and noti-
fy the alleged victim. 6 The court must then conduct a hearing in camera before mak-
ing the final determination concerning the admissibility of the evidence."
Trial judges and appellate courts generally agree that prior false rape allegations
do not constitute sexual behavior within the meaning of rape shield statutes," and
therefore are not excluded by rape shield laws. Notwithstanding that rape shield laws
do not exclude prior false allegations from being admitted, testimony regarding a char-
acter trait of the victim may only be proved by reputation or opinion testimony. 9
Consequently, prior false allegations may only be introduced under the character rules
to prove something other than the complainant's negative character, such as the
complainant's motive, opportunity or intent.'
Some courts have admitted the introduction of false rape accusations, reasoning
that these allegations present a corrupt state of mind, or a similar motive to fabri-
cate.6 One court even held that the witness' behavior in falsely accusing somebody
was habit."i Evidence of other acts or wrongs is always allowed under the character
55. FED. R. EviD. 412(c)(1)(A).
56. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(1)(B).
57. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(2).
58. U.S. v. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (W.D. N.C. 1991) (past false allegations of sexual
assault are not evidence of past sexual conduct); West v. State, 722 S.W.2d 284, 290 (Ark. 1987) (ev-
idence that complainant had filed prior charges of sexual assault was not sexual conduct); Calloway v.
State, 404 S.E.2d 811, 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (rape shield statute did not affect admissibility of evi-
dence of prior false accusations); State v. Barber, 766 P.2d 1288, 1289 (Kan. App. 1989) (evidence of
alleged sex offense victim's prior false accusations is not evidence of "past sexual conduct"); People v.
Williams, 477 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Mich. App. 1991) (rape shield statute would not preclude evidence of
prior false allegation of rape); Efrain M. v. State, 823 P.2d 264, 265 (Nev. 1991) (rape shield statute
prohibits only evidence of past sexual conduct, but that prior false allegations are not conduct); Brown
v. State, 807 P.2d 1379, 1380 (Nev. 1991) (same); Miller v. State, 779 P.2d 87, 89 (Nev. 1989) (rape
shield statute does not prohibit cross-examining complaining witnesses about fabricated rape accounts);
State v. Baron, 292 S.E.2d 741, 743 (N.C. App. 1982) (rape shield statute did not preclude introduc-
tion of evidence that complainant made similar charges against other relatives); State v. Boggs, 588
N.E.2d 813, 816 (Ohio 1992) (it is within discretion of trial court to permit cross-examination concern-
ing prior false accusations of rape); State v. Hendricks, 791 P.2d 139 (Or. App. 1990) (accusation of
sexual abuse was not sexual behavior within meaning of rape shield statute); State v. Wattenbarger,
776 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Or. App. 1989) (same); State v. LeClair, 730 P.2d 609, 613 (Or. App. 1986)
(same). But contra United States v. Cardinal, 782 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1986) (since evidence of prior
false accusations did not fall within one of three defined exceptions to Rule 412, the evidence must be
excluded); Carter v. State, 451 N.E.2d 639 (Ind. 1983) (testimony regarding whether complainant had
made prior sexual assault charges was excluded as a violation of the rape shield statute).
For a comprehensive examination of the cases in which evidence of false rape allegations has
been considered, as well as the particular circumstances under which such evidence was allowed, see
Nancy M. King, Annotation, Impeachment or Cross-Examination of Prosecuting Witness in Sexual
Offense Trial By Showing That Similar Charges Were Made Against Other Persons, 71 A.L.R. 4th 469
(1989).
59. FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
60. FED. R. EVID..404(b).
61. United States v. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (W.D. N.C. 1991) (false rape accusations
go to the motive or bias of the complainant); Phillips v. State, 545 So. 2d 221, 223 (Ala. Crim. App.
1989) (evidence of prior false allegations was admissible as exposing victim's corrupt state of mind);
People v. Hurlburt, 333 P.2d 82, 86-87 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (false rape allegations are admissi-
ble as showing the complainant's animosity towards the defendant); People v. McClure, 356 N.E.2d
899, 901 (1l. App. Ct. 1976) (since false rape allegations concerned motivation in bringing current
charge, evidence of these false charges should have been admitted); State v. Anderson, 686 P.2d 193,
198-201 (Mont. 1984) (evidence of prior false rape accusations should be admitted as probative of the
state of mind of the complainant).
62. Ex parte Loyd, 580 So. 2d 1374, 1376 (Ala. 1991). The characterization is blatantly errone-
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rules to prove motive, intent or plan.63 Additionally, since motive or plan is treated as
a substantive element of the case, the strictures of the character rules do not apply, and
extrinsic evidence may be admitted. For example, in Phillips v. State,' a 1989 deci-
sion, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court's decision to
exclude testimony that the victim had brought prior unfounded rape charges against
three other persons. Since this evidence did not highlight the victim's past sexual be-
havior, but merely "exposed her corrupt state of mind," the evidence was admissi-
ble.'
B. Admissible as Evidence of Credibility
In sexual assault cases, the victim is often the sole witness. As such, the credibil-
ity of the complaining witness is essential to the strength of the prosecution's case, and
is frequently attacked by defense attorneys. The credibility rules, an exception to the
character rules described above, allow an attorney to construct a propensity argument
regarding the truthfulness or untruthfulness of a witness.' Since evidence admitted
pursuant to the credibility rules may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness,67 such evidence does not go to the issue of consent. Instead, the evidence
concerns whether the witness is lying on the witness stand. Although all jurisdictions
have rejected the belief of Professor Wigmore that rape complainants lack general
credibility," evidence admitted under the credibility rules allows defense attorneys to
ous. Habit, according to the Advisory Committee Note, "describes one's regular response to a repeated
specific situation." FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee's note. Such practices as smoking a cigarette
after every meal, or taking the same route to work every day would be habits. Falsely accusing some-
body of rape is not done regularly or automatically enough to be considered a habit.
63. FED R. EvID. 404(b).
64. Phillips v. State, 545 So. 2d 221 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
65. Id. at 223. By admitting evidence of specific wrongs or acts to prove intent or knowledge,
the Federal Rules permit evidence of specific wrongs to show different levels of a person's state of
mind. Rather than different levels of state of mind, the Alabama court allows the introduction of spe-
cific acts to demonstrate a corrupt or clean state of mind. This construction resembles the type of
character evidence that is usually limited to proof by reputation or opinion. FED. R. EvD. 405(a).
66. Federal Rule of Evidence 608, pertaining to the credibility of a witness, provides:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be
attacked or supjorted by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of
the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or other-
wise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of a
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or un-
truthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined
has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not oper-
ate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against self-incrimination when
examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
FED. R. EVID. 608.
Most states have a similar bar against the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove credibility.
Extrinsic evidence may sometimes be introduced not for credibility purposes, but to disprove a state-
ment that comprises a material issue within the case. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
67. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
68. The 1970 edition of the Wigmore treatise stated: "Occasionally is found in woman [sexual as-
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use prior instances of untruthfulness by the witness to argue that there is a greater
likelihood that they are lying in the present situation. Prior false rape allegations are
often introduced through the credibility rules.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked through opinion or reputation evi-
dence.' Additionally, specific instances of untruthfulness by a witness may be exam-
ined upon cross-examination of that witness.' In a sexual assault case, a defense at-
tomey may call other witnesses to provide reputation or opinion, but not specific acts
evidence about the general untruthfulness of a complaining witness." Similarly, Rule
608 provides that "[s]pecific instances of the conduct of the witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of a crime as
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence."72 The upshot of this
rule is that the answer of a complaining witness must be taken as true, and is not
subject to refutation by extrinsic evidence. This rnie1 n ly applies, however, for the
purposes of attacking the credibility of the witness. If evidence is used not to attack
the general credibility of the witness, but to contradict the testimony of a witness as to
a material issue, then the introduction of extrinsic evidence is permissible.73 This dis-
tinction, difficult to define and even more difficult to apply, plays a critical role in the
admission of prior false allegations of rape.
The most frequently used method of admitting evidence of prior false rape charg-
es is through the credibility rules. A majority of jurisdictions have held that evidence
of prior false accusations is admissible to impeach the credibility of the complaining
witness.74 Additionally, several courts have held that if the complainant denies making
sault] complainants . . .a dangerous form of abnormal mentality ... to fabricate irresponsibly charges
of sex offenses against persons totally innocent." 3A WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 934a.
69. FED. R. EvID. 608(a).
70. FED. R. EvID. 608(b).
71. Once the defense introduces reputation or opinion evidence of the complaining witness' un-
truthful character, the prosecution may cross-examine the defense witness about the defendant's truthful
acts. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
72. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
73. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 9J 608[05], 608-49-608-
57 (1985). Weinstein and Berger state that
The Rule 608(b) requirement that 'the examiner must take his answer' does not prevent
extrinsic evidence from being admitted to attack the witness' credibility on some theory
other than impeachment by prior misconduct. Counsel and courts sometimes have diffi-
culty in distinguishing between Rule 608 impeachment and impeachment by contradiction.
The troublesome kind of case has arisen when the witness-usually the defendant-makes a
claim on direct examination inconsistent with bad conduct. Extrinsic evidence may not be
admitted pursuant to Rule 608 to rebut this claim. Whether extrinsic evidence may be
admitted on a theory of impeachment by contradiction would depend on the circum-
stances of the case."
Id. See, e.g., Boutros v. Canton Reg'l Transit Auth., 997 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1993) (Rule 608(b)'s
prohibitions on extrinsic evidence do not apply in determining the admissibility of relevant evidence to
contradict a witness' testimony as to a material issues); Lamborn v. Dittmer, 873 F.2d 522 (2d Cir.
1989); United States v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Opager, 589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979).
74. See Covington v. Alaska, 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); People v. Simbolo, 532
P.2d 962, 963-64 (Colo. 1975); State v. Schwartzmiller, 685 P.2d 830, 833 (Idaho 1984); People v.
Gorney, 481 N.E.2d 673, 675-76 (I11. 1985); Little v. State, 413 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. App. 1980);
State v. Barber, 766 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Cox, 468 A.2d 319, 324 (Md.
1983); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (Mass. 1978); People v. Garvie, 384
N.W.2d 796, 798 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982); Miller
v. State, 779 P.2d 87, 89 (Nev. 1989); State v. Johnson, 692 P.2d 35, 43 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); State
v. Boggs, 588 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ohio 1992); State v. McCarthy, 446 A.2d 1034, 1034-35 (R.I. 1982);
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the allegations, counsel may introduce extrinsic evidence to prove that the allegations
were made." An example of this may be found in the 1989 Nevada case of Miller v.
State."6 The court began by asserting that a complaining witness' prior false allega-
tions of sexual abuse were highly probative of truthfulness." After holding that prior
false allegations were not protected under the rape shield law, the court allowed the
introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove such prior false acts. The court stated:
We hold, therefore, that in a sexual assault case, [the rape shield statute] does not
bar the cross-examination of a complaining witness about prior false accusations.
Accordingly, under conditions specified hereafter, defense counsel may cross-exam-
ine a complaining witness about previous fabricated accusations, and if the witness
denies making the allegations, counsel may introduce extrinsic evidence to prove
that, in the past, the witness made fabricated charges.78
Similar to the Federal Rules,79 Nevada did not allow extrinsic evidence to disprove
the denial of a witness as to past conduct.' Noting that their holding contradicted this
rule, the court opined "[t]o the extent that our holding transcends the limitations of [the
extrinsic evidence rule], we carve out an exception for sexual assault cases."'"
In People v. Mikula,82 the court reached a similar result. In that case, a Michi-
gan appellate court overturned the trial court's denial of a discovery motion that pre-
cluded introducing evidence of prior false accusations by the complaining witness. The
court held that a defendant may cross-examine a complainant regarding prior false rape
accusations.83 If the witness denies making such charges, the defendant may introduce
contrary evidence. 4 This court justified this departure from the usual credibility rules
by stating that "[iln a case such as the one before us, where the verdict necessarily
turned on the credibility of the complainant, it is imperative that the defendant be
given an opportunity to place before the jury evidence so fundamentally affecting the
complainant's credibility." 5 Although the court cited precedents dating back to 1888,
it failed to explain its logic for circumventing the statutory prohibition against extrinsic
evidence.
C. Admissible as a Constitutional Requirement
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides an accused in a
criminal prosecution with the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and
to have compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses." Although arguments
Thomas v. State, 669 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
75. Hall v. State, 374 N.E.2d 62, 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); People v. Mikula, 269 N.W.2d 195,
198-99 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Barber, 766 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); Miller v.
State, 779 P.2d 87, 89 (Nev. 1989); Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 263, 265 (Va. 1988). But
cf State v. Boggs, 588 N.E.2d 813, 816 (Ohio 1992) (refusing to allow extrinsic evidence of prior
false charges to be admitted into evidence).
76. Miller v. State, 779 P.2d 87 (Nev. 1989).
77. Id. at 89. The court cited Wigmore's treatise to substantiate this proposition.
78. Id. at 89.
79. FED. R. EVlD. 608(b).
80. Moore v. State, 607 P.2d 105, 107-08 (Nev. 1980).
81. Miller, 779 P.2d at 90.
82. People v. Mikula, 269 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
83. Id. at 198-99.
84. Id. at 199.
85. Id.
86. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
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asserting the unconstitutionality of rape shield laws generally have been dismissed,87
some courts have held that the exclusion of prior false rape accusations violates the
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation.88 For example, in People v. Wil-
liams,89 the trial court refused to allow the defendant to conduct an inquiry concern-
ing a previous sexual assault accusation filed by the victim. The appellate court opined
that the credibility of the witness was critical to the case, and that the preclusion of
prior false accusations of rape would unconstitutionally abridge the defendant's right to
confrontation.'e Although the trial court erred in excluding the evidence under the
rape shield law without inquiring further into the nature of the false charges, the defen-
dant failed to make the requisite offer of proof to justify introduction of the evi-
dence."' The court held that defendants should be afforded the protections of the con-
stitution, without being allowed to conduct a "fishing expedition," in the hopes of
turning up a false accusation.'
Although a state policy excluding evidence tending to show bias or prejudice
may violate the Confrontation Clause,93 a recent Supreme Court decision, Michigan v.
Lucas,94 held that reasonable procedural requirements may be imposed on criminal
defendants. During his trial for third degree sexual conduct, Nolan Lucas sought to in-
troduce evidence of his prior sexual relationship with the victim. Because Lucas failed
to notify the prosecution of his intent to introduce this evidence, a requirement of the
Michigan rape shield statute, his motion was denied. Lucas argued that the Sixth
Amendment prevented the judge from excluding the evidence. The Supreme Court
rejected an absolute rule that would prohibit preclusion of evidence of prior sexual
conduct between a complaining witness and an accused.95 As in prior cases limiting
the effect of the Confrontation Clause,' the Court held that the right to confront wit-
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause was applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
87. For arguments concerning the unconstitutionality of rape shield laws, see Tanford & Bocchino,
supra note 33, passim; Haxton, supra note 33, at 1226-27; Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility,
and the Constitution: Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 44
CATH. U. L. REv. 709, 721-23 (1995); Robin Rubrecht Dill, The Oklahoma Rape Shield Statute: Who
Needs a Shield When the Opponents' Weapons Have Been Seized, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 727,
740-43 (1992); Richard W. Miller III, Stephens v. Miller: Placing Rape Shield Statutes Between Rock
and a Hard Place, 27 U. TOL. L. REv. 217, 244-47 (1995).
88. People v. Sheperd, 551 P.2d 210, 212 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Cox, 468 A.2d 319,
322 (Md. 1983); People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120, 127 (Mich. 1984); People v. Williams, 477
N.W.2d 877, 879 (Mich. Cs. App. 1991); State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982); State
v. Baron, 292 S.E.2d 741, 743 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); State v. LeClair, 730 P.2d 609, 614 (Or. C.
App. 1987); State v. McCarthy, 446 A.2d 1034, 1035 (R.I. 1982).
89. People v. Williams, 477 N.W.2d 877 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
90. Id. at 879.
91. Id. at 879-81.
92. Id. at 880.
93. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). In Davis, the defendant was precluded from obtaining
disclosure of a witness' juvenile court record for impeachment purposes. The Court held that this pre-
clusion violated Davis' right to confront witnesses. The right of confrontation trumped the state's poli-
cy underlying the confidentiality of juvenile court records.
94. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991). For a thorough and critical explication of the Lucas
decision, see Lara English Simmons, Michigan v. Lucas: Failing to Define the State Interest in Rape
Shield Legislation, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1592 (1992).
95. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149.
96. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970) (holding the Confrontation Clause does not
preclude introduction of an out-of-court declaration, taken under oath and subject to cross-examination,
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nesses could be limited to "accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process." Since the state has a legitimate state interest in protecting rape victims
from harassing or offensive interrogation about their sexual history, the notice require-
ment was constitutionally permissible."
The recent decisions limiting the effect of the Confrontation Clause call into
question whether prior false rape allegations are constitutionally required to be admit-
ted." If they are used to demonstrate the bias or prejudice of the witness, then they
would most likely be admissible under Davis. If false rape allegations are used to
attack the general credibility of a witness, then the state interest in prohibiting the
proof of prior false rape accusations by extrinsic evidencei °° may trump the
defendant's right to confront the witness. Although the distinction between proving
bias or prejudice and proving general credibility is often unclear, such distinctions
make the difference in determining whether the evidence of false rape allegations is
admitted.
IV. THE NEED FOR A RULE DEALING WITH
PRIOR FALSE RAPE ALLEGATIONS
The purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to "secure fairness in adminis-
tration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that truth may be ascertained and pro-
to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein, when the declarant is available as a witness at trial);
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400 (1986) (holding the Confrontation Clause does not require
'the Government to show that a non-testifying co-conspirator is unavailable to testify, as a condition for
admission of that co-conspirator's out-of-court statements); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211
(1987) (holding the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a non-testifying co-
defendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction, when the confession eliminates any references
to the defendant's existence); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 564 (1988) (holding the Confron-
tation Clause does not prohibit testimony concerning a prior, out-of-court identification when the identi-
fying witness is unable, because of memory loss, to explain the basis for the identification); Maryland
v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990) (Confrontation Clause does not prohibit a child witness in a child
abuse case from testifying against a defendant at trial, outside the defendant's physical presence, by
one-way closed circuit television); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 827 (1990) (holding the Confronta-
tion Clause is not violated when statements from a child who is unable to testify at trial are admitted
under a hearsay exception against a defendant who stands accused of abusing her so long as particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness are met).
97. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149.
98. Id. The Court refused to decide whether the preclusion of the evidence was justified, but re-
manded to the state courts for that determination.
99. This section only examines whether the Confrontation Clause of the federal Constitution re-
quires the admission of prior false rape allegations. All of the states have their own state constitutional
provisions allowing an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Some states assure the
defendant of the right to meet the witnesses "face-to-face." Louisiana specifically provides a right to
"confront and cross-examine the witnesses." LA. CONST. art. 1, § 16. See BARRY LATZER, STATE CON-
STITUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 203-04 (1991) for a compilation of the confrontation of witnesses
provisions of the state constitutions.
If a state decides, under independent state grounds, that the admission of prior false rape allega-
tions is required by their state constitution, the Supreme Court will not reverse that determination. See
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
100. The interests of the state in prohibiting the proof of prior sexual allegations through extrinsic
evidence is twofold. Similar to character evidence, evidence of prior false rape accusations carries a
potential for substantial prejudice. Additionally, the prohibition against extrinsic evidence was designed
to eliminate the needless consumption of time through the conducting of several mini-trials. See 23
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDURE § 6112
(1980 & Supp. 1996).
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ceedings justly determined." ' The rules surrounding prior false rape accusations are
a judicial morass. The only thing that can be said for certain is that the Committee
Note to the amended Rule 412 provides that "Evidence offered to prove allegedly false
prior claims by the victim is not barred by Rule 412. However, this evidence is subject
to the requirements of Rule 404.' '" °" As rule 404 cross-references the credibility rules,
false rape allegations are admissible for credibility purposes, and are governed by
Rules 607, 608 and 609. As with all evidence, the admission of such false accusations
must pass through the Rule 403 balancing test.'0 3 Although the committee note ulti-
mately resolves that Rule 412 deals with sex, not lies, this is only the beginning of our
problems. Analyzing the present jurisprudence regarding prior false rape allegations in
light of the purposes of the Federal Rules, the need to replace the current, ad hoc
approach to this problem with a definite rule becomes manifest.
A. Fairness in Administration
Although arguments based on what is fair may often be supplanted by arguments
based upon what is logical, the use of the term "fairness" in Rule 102 suggests "an
awareness of the limitations of our verbal apparatus and the need to make room for
feelings that cannot be expressed in the language of the law."'" A fundamental pre-
cept of fairness is that all persons in similar situations should be treated equally. Al-
though idealistic, the uniformity envisioned by that ideal was desired by Congress
when they enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence. If the rules of evidence apply rea-
soning from a common source to twenty different cases and achieve twenty different
results, they have accomplished their goal.0 The rules were deliberately created to
permit a flexible approach to problems not explicitly covered by the rules, and placed
responsibility on trial judges and attorneys." The current methods by which the
evidentiary system handles false rape accusations demonstrates the problems with this
flexibility. Instead of applying reasoning from a common source, courts interpreting
the existing rules are producing outcome-based jurisprudence. One need only look at
the cases in the previous section to see judicially created exceptions to existing rules,
and decisions that fail to provide supporting legal authority." Such a jurisprudence
fails to provide guidance to the defendant concerning the type of arguments he will
have to make in order to present evidence of prior allegations, or the type of proof he
will have to provide to substantiate those allegations. Similarly, the current system of
ad hoc determinations fails to afford the witness advance notice of whether prior alle-
gations may be examined on cross-examination, and whether other witnesses will be
allowed to testify concerning these allegations."° Unlike the current approach, a defi-
101. FED. R. EVID. 102.
102. FED. R. EvID. 412 committee's note.
103. FED. R. EVID. 403.
104. 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 5023, at 135 (1977).
105. As Wright and Graham note, "The uniformity of result was seen as an impossible, if not an
undesirable, ideal." Id. § 1023, at 127.
106. 1 WEINsTEiN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 102.02[5] (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997).
107. See Miller v. State, 779 P.2d 87 (Nev. 1989) and People v. Mikula, 269 N.W.2d 195 (Mich.
CL App. 1978).
108. Courts should consider fairness to the witness as well as to the parties and the public.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 104, § 5023. Rape shield statutes represent an obvious example of a
legislative enactment motivated by concerns about fairness to the witness.
[Vol. 24:125
1998] Rape Shield Laws
nite rule addressing prior false rape allegations would promote reasoning from a com-
mon source and provide fairness to both the defendant and the complaining witness.
B. Elimination of Expense
Similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure,"° one of the primary purposes of the Rules of Evidence is the elimi-
nation of unjustifiable expense and delay. Although justice should never be compro-
mised in the interest of expense, "[jiudges are forced to allocate resources among
various litigants by manipulation of the rules of evidence in accordance with a set of
surreptitious rules-of-thumb.""0 Given the existence of these determinations, an evi-
dentiary system that provides fixed rules concerning admissibility permits intelligent
decisions by lawyers about what evidence to present in court. The upshot of fixed rules
is the prevention of unnecessary expenditure of time and energy chasing down evi-
dence that will not be admitted.
Obtaining evidence of prior false rape allegations requires a significant commit-
ment of time and money from a defendant. Notwithstanding the cases involving high-
profile celebrities who can afford to conduct an entire background investigation of the
complaining witness,"' many defendants do not possess the pecuniary resources nec-
essary to locate witnesses and compel testimony that may never reach the witness
stand."' The enactment of a rule concerning the introduction of prior false allega-
tions would spare litigants the unnecessary time and expense involved in eliciting
testimony that is subsequently excluded through questionable interpretations of false
rape allegations under the existing rules."3
109. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 states that the rules "shall be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 2 states that the rules "shall be construed to secure simplicity in proce-
dure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." FED. R. CiM.
P. 2.
110. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 104, § 5024, at 142.
111. In the William Kennedy Smith rape trial, described above, lawyers for Smith conducted a rig-
orous background examination of the complaining witness, Patricia Bowman. They argued that Bowman
possessed a long-standing psychological disorder, lingering trauma from having been sexually abused
when she was eight years of age, and that she was laboring under the emotional effects of at least
two abortions and one miscarriage. See ESTRICH, supra note 34, at 15.
In the recent, well-publicized, forcible sodomy case of sportscaster Mary Albert, lawyers for
Albert spent months doing a background investigation on the complaining witness. After claiming to
have obtained "upwards of 30 witnesses" who knew the background of the complainant, the defense
attempted to show the woman had sought to entrap Albert. Judge Benjamin N.A. Kendrick disallowed
testimony of the complainant's conflicts with former lovers, and Albert pleaded guilty to a misdemean-
or assault and battery charge. See Interview: Defense Attorney Roy Black Discusses the Mary Albert
Trial, TODAY, Sept. 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11223529.
112. If the desired witness lives in a different state, it becomes increasingly difficult to compel
their testimony. Under the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses From Without a State
in Criminal Proceedings, the applicant desiring to compel the witness' attendance must establish the
materiality of the witness. UNIF. AcT SECURE ATTEND. WrrNESSES WITHOUT STATE IN CRIM. PROC.
§ 3 (1936). Courts, recognizing the harshness of the procedure, are often reluctant to grant the applica-
tion compelling the attendance of the out-of-state witness. See, e.g., People v. McCartney, 345 N.E.2d
326 (N.Y. 1976) (defendant failed to meet burden of proving materiality of testimony of out-of-state
witness at pre-trial hearing to suppress defendant's prior statements as being involuntary).
113. Included in the necessary risks of litigation is the possibility that resources will be drained
obtaining testimony that is subsequently excluded. Although evidentiary rules are supposed to reduce
this risk, the current interpretations of the existing rules merely increase the risk.
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C. Promotion of Growth and Development of the Law
The final purpose of the Rules of Evidence is "promotion of growth and devel-
opment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and pro-
ceedings justly determined."" 4 Whether one views the trial as a scientific event, the
approach taken by the Progressive school,'15 or as a political event, the primary pur-
pose of the trial remains the ascertainment of truth. To ascertain truth, the Federal
Rules adopt an exclusive attitude towards inclusion and admit all relevant evi-
dence,1 1 6 unless otherwise excluded by the Constitution, statute or other rule. " 7 Al-
lowing the credibility of a witness to be examined,"8 an exception to the usual prohi-
bitions against the introduction of character evidence,"9 further underscores the para-
mount position that truth-finding occupies within the rules of evidence.
Although the mutabl nature of the .l facilitates the growth and development
of the law of evidence, 2 ° the current system inhibits the truth and justice sought by
the letter of the rules. Since the critical issue in a rape case is whether a rape of the
complainant by the defendant actually occurred, the credibility of the complaining
witness is a material issue. To exclude evidence concerning the credibility of the com-
plainant jeopardizes the ascertainment of truth, especially if the witness directly contra-
dicts the evidence sought to be admitted by the defendant. A rule that admits evidence
of prior false rape allegations, without subjecting all rape complainants to the type of
demeaning and character besmirching rape trials held before the introduction of rape
shield laws, would promote the ascertainment of truth without compromising the jus-
tice of the proceedings.
V. PROPOSED RULE FOR HANDLING PRIOR
FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF RAPE
The following proposed rule represents the author's attempt to handle prior false
allegations of rape, succeeded by an explanation of the individual portions of the rule.
Proposed Rule - Sex Offense Cases; Evidence of Complaining Witness' Prior
False Allegations of Sexual Assault
(a) In a criminal proceeding in which a person is accused of sexual assault, evi-
dence of the complaining witness' prior allegations of sexual assault against a
person other than the accused may be admitted, subject to the conditions of subdi-
vision (b).
(b) Procedure to determine admissibility-
(1) An accused intending to offer evidence under subdivision (a) must:
(A) file a written motion at least fourteen days before trial specifically de-
scribing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered unless
114. FED. R. EVID. 102.
115. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 104, § 5025, at 147-49.
116. Relevant evidence means "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
117. FED. R. EVID. 402.
118. FED. R. EVID. 607, 608, 609.
119. FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(3).
120. See United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1169 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007
(1978) (federal rules are designed to be applied by analogy to new situations).
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the court, for good cause requires a different time for filing or permits filing
during trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the complaining witness or,
where appropriate, the complaining witness' guardian or representative.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must conduct a hearing
in camera and afford the complaining witness and parties a right to attend and
be heard. The motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing must be
sealed and remain under seal unless the court orders otherwise.
(3) In order to introduce evidence under this rule, the accused must establish, by
clear and convincing evidence, that:
(A) the complaining witness made an allegation or allegations of sexual
assault against a person other than the accused;
(B) the allegation or allegations made by the complaining witness were false;
and
(C) the probative value of the evidence sought to be admitted under this rule
is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
(c) Extrinsic evidence. If the accused satisfies the conditions of subdivision (b), the
accused may cross-examine the complaining witness concerning the allegation or
allegations. If the complaining witness denies or fails to recall making such allega-
tion or allegations, the accused may present extrinsic evidence of the false allega-
tion or allegations.
(d) Definitions. As used in this rule, the following terms shall have the following
respective meanings:
(1) Allegation. An actual, formal complaint lodged with someone in authority,
regardless of whether the complaint resulted in prosecution.
(2) Sexual assault. A crime under the laws of this jurisdiction involving any
conduct proscribed by [relevant provisions of the jurisdiction's penal code].
(3) Complaining witness. Any person alleging to be the victim of the crime
charged, the prosecution of which is subject to the provisions of this rule.
This rule attempts to provide the consistency and stability that has been lacking
from this delicate area of the law, without eviscerating the protections afforded to a
complaining witness. This rule attempts to answer the three essential questions under-
lying the admission of this evidence: whether evidence of prior false allegations should
be admitted, what procedures should be implemented for the admission of this evi-
dence and what methods of proof should be allowed to introduce this evidence. These
questions, as answered by the proposed rule, are addressed in order.
A. Should Evidence of Prior False Allegations Be Admitted?
Consistent with existing jurisprudence, the proposed rule allows evidence of prior
false rape allegations to be admitted under certain conditions. This rule follows the
principle, established through case law, that prior false rape accusations represent evi-
dence of lies, not sex, and do not fall within the protections of the rape shield stat-
utes. 2 ' Unlike crimes where the character of the victim is called into question, such
as the chastity of a rape complainant under pre-rape shield law or the aggressiveness
of a homicide victim, evidence of false rape accusations deal entirely with the victim
as a witness. Treating evidence of these allegations as character evidence rather than
121. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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credibility distorts the distinction between victim as victim and victim as witness.'22
Consonant with the existing credibility rules, which allow for the admission of a wider
range of evidence than the character rules," 3 witnesses can be examined about their
prior falsehoods. In this respect, the proposed rule represents a necessary restatement
of the existing credibility rules.
B. What Procedures Should Be Implemented for the Admission of This
Evidence?
In order to secure the protections of complaining witnesses from defendants who
may attempt to use the rules to conduct a "fishing expedition" for false accusations,
the proposed rule imposes strict procedural limitations on the introduction of prior
false allegations. In order to introduce evidence of these allegations, the accused must
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the complaining witness made a false
allegation, and that the probative value of admitting this allegation would not be out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. As prior true allegations of sexual abuse
fall within the protections of the rape shield statutes,'24 the falsity of the allegations
must be established." This proposed rule establishes the standard by which this fal-
sity must be established. Additionally, the trial judge is afforded the discretion to disal-
low evidence that would be unfairly prejudicial.'26 The procedures that the proposed
rule establish closely mimic the procedures for admitting evidence under Federal Rule
412. An accused must both offer the prosecution fair notice and inform the complain-
ing witness of his intent to offer this evidence. The complaining witness has a right to
122. Character rules concern elements of conduct that made it more or less likely that a specific
event occurred. If a homicide victim was hot-tempered, that temper may have resulted in his demise.
The fact that the complaining witness lied about prior "rapes" would not make it more or less likely
that sexual intercourse occurred. The fact that the complaining witness filed a prior false allegation
would make it more or less likely that she is lying on this particular occasion. This is a credibility
argument, and differs from the character arguments found in Rules 404 and 405.
123. The credibility rules admit further evidence of specific acts than do the character rules. A de-
fendant who wishes to attack a victim's character for peacefulness may only use reputation or opinion
testimony. FED. R. EviD. 404, 405. A defendant who wishes to attack the same victim's character for
truthfulness may, in the discretion of the court, inquire on cross-examination about specific acts of un-
truthfulness by the victim. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
124. The advisory committee note to the 1994 amendments to Rule 412 define sexual behavior as
"all activities that involve actual physical conduct, i.e., sexual intercourse or sexual contact." FED. R.
EVID. 412 committee's note. This definition would include prior rapes within the definition of sexual
behavior, and render them inadmissible. Similarly, commentators have noted that this evidence has little
relevance and may distract the jury. Fishman, supra note 87, at 771.
125. This view correlates with the existing case law, which provides overwhelmingly that the falsi-
ty of the allegations must be proved before they may be admitted. See, e.g., Hughes v. Raines, 641
F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1981); Phillips v. State, 545 So. 2d 221, 223 (Ala. Crin. App. 1989);
Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Hutchinson, 688 P.2d 209,
213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Slater, 579 A.2d 591, 593 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990); Smith v. State,
377 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ga. 1989); Idaho v. Schwartzmiller, 685 P.2d 830, 833 (Idaho 1984); People v.
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attend and be heard at the subsequent hearing to determine the admissibility of the
evidence. Because these allegations will be protected by the rape shield statute if the
defendant cannot make a requisite showing of falsity, the proceedings are to be con-
ducted in camera and remain under seal. By implementing these procedural require-
ments, the defendant may still obtain this critical evidence upon a proper showing
without diminishing the rights of the complaining witness.
C. What Methods of Proof Should Be Allowed to Introduce This Evidence?
The proposed rule would establish two methods of proof for the introduction of
prior false rape allegations after the judge has made the requisite findings. First, the
complaining witness could be cross-examined about these claims. Subsequently, if the
witness denies making or fails to recollect these charges, extrinsic evidence of these
allegations may be admitted. This rule deviates from the traditional statutory prohibi-
tion on the introduction of extrinsic evidence.'" Historically, extrinsic evidence was
excluded because of its potential to confuse the central issues of the case and to result
in the needless consumption of time.'" The admission of this evidence is warranted
by the circumstances under which it is offered.
The credibility of a complainant is a central, and often determining issue in a
rape case. In many rape cases, the jury is required to decide based not upon physical
or scientific evidence, but based upon "the diametrically opposed versions of the event
put forth by the complainant and the accused."' 29 Prior false allegations of criminal
activity, especially for a crime carrying the social opprobrium and harsh punishments
of rape, are highly probative of a witness' credibility.'" Since the credibility of the
complaining witness in a rape case is so probative, the jury must be afforded the op-
portunity to embrace or ignore any relevant evidence bearing on this material issue.
Consequently, if the complaining witness denies making false charges after the judge
at a preliminary hearing has determined both the existence and falsity of prior allega-
tions, the accused should be allowed to introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict the
witness' testimony. One of the central policy reasons justifying the prohibition against
extrinsic evidence is the desire to avoid the multiplicity of mini-trials and hearings
concerning tangential issues. Allowing extrinsic evidence for the limited purpose of
proving that the victim falsely accused somebody of a crime is a reasonable and well-
defined exception to this policy determination. Currently, most states and the federal
rules require a motion and hearing before evidence that falls within an exception to the
rape shield statute may be admitted.' 3' Additionally, the proposed rule follows the
practice of requiring a hearing to determine the falsity of prior rape allegations before
they may be admitted into evidence.'32 Allowing an accused who has demonstrated
127. FED. R. EVlD. 608(b).
128. See Kerper & MacDonald, supra note 12, at 285.
129. Galvin, supra note 33, at 861.
130. Id. Moreover, Professor Fishman writes:
[o]ther than murder, sexual assault is perhaps the most serious accusation one person can
make against another. The accusation alone is likely to permanently damage the
accused's reputation, jeopardize his professional standing, and disrupt and traumatize his
family. To accuse someone falsely of sexual assault is, therefore, a despicable and malig-
nant act which reveals far more about the accuser's character than do other, more com-
mon, less destructive falsehoods.
Fishman, supra note 87, at 768.
131. FED. R. EVID. 412(c).
132. Most courts require falsity of prior allegations to be demonstrated before they may be admit-
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the existence of prior false rape allegations to admit extrinsic evidence of these allega-
tions presents a minimal additional burden on the existing hearing requirements. This
additional burden is consistent with current procedures fof handling evidence of prior
sexual behavior and false rape allegations, and does not waste the time or the resources
of the court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior false rape accusations demonstrate a willingness on the part of the accuser
to manipulate the legal process and use sexual allegations unjustly. Consequently, these
lies should not be shielded from the jury. The admission of prior false rape accusations
by a complaining witness allows a jury to consider these specific acts of the
complainant's credibility. Since the admission of this evidence targets specific persons
who have made these allegations, it does not seek to attack the credibility of all, or
even most rape victims.
Although courts have consistently held that evidence of prior false rape allega-
tions should be admitted, they have used specious legal reasoning and questionable
invocations of precedent to achieve this desired result. By failing to provide a consis-
tent and uniform approach to this matter, the evidentiary rules have failed to effectuate
their purpose. The proper way to meet this purpose is not to subject this evidence to
novel or dubitable interpretations of existing rules of evidence, but to make additions
or amendments to the rules. If this Note produces a movement in that direction, it will
have accomplished its purpose.
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